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PUTTING THE
SECURITIES LAWS
TO THE TEST
The long-standingapproachto federalsecuritiesregulationis not working.
BY ELISABETH DE FONTENAY
f all the federal regulatory regimes, many
would argue that the U.S. securities laws
reign supreme, both in their design and
function. They are widely touted as the
country's first line of defense against a
repeat of the Great Depression. (It is no
coincidence that the federal government
first began regulating securities immediately following the Depression.) While the recent financial crisis calls into question just how
much protection the securities laws actually offer, the widespread
view is that matters would only have been worse with unregulated, anything-goes capital markets. Indeed, the market for credit
default swaps, perhaps the most notorious contributor to the
financial crisis, was not subject to securities regulation at the time.
But what do we actually know about whether the securities
laws work? Given the trillions of dollars at stake in the financial
markets and the dramatic economic consequences of getting it
wrong, figuring out whether the securities laws are actually doing
their job is absolutely crucial. Surprisingly, we lack a definitive
answer to this question, even after eight decades of federal securities regulation.

MANDATORY DISCLOSURE IN FEDERAL
SECURITIES REGULATION

There are many ways in which government could regulate
securities offerings and trading. A common approach under
pre-Depression state law was for a state agency to review each
investment offered to citizens of that state and either approve
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or reject it according to its perceived level of risk. In contrast
to this heavy-handed (and often arbitrary) approach in which
the government acts as gatekeeper for corporate capital raising, the New Deal-era federal regulators opted simply to mandate disclosure by any company proposing to issue securities. In
other words, issuers did not have to meet specific financial or
accounting criteria or pay their way into the markets; they simply had to make public various information about the issuing
company and the securities being issued. The thought was that
requiring disclosure of the good, the bad, and the ugly would
root out much of the fraud that permeated pre-Depression
markets and provide investors with a clearer picture of the
quality of firms competing for their investment money. That
supposedly would lead to better investment decisions. As eventual Supreme Court justice Louis Brandeis noted, "[S]unlight
is the best disinfectant."
What does mandatory disclosure actually entail for purposes
of the securities laws? While the rules are complex and exceptions
abound, the required disclosures fall into two broad categories:
* disclosures to be made at the time a security is issued (which
are filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission in a
securities registration statement or "prospectus")
" post-issuance disclosures that are to be made on an ongoing,
periodic basis (captured in 10-K, 10 -Q, and 8-K filings, for
example)
The actual information to be disclosed is ever-increasing, but
the broad categories include periodic financial disclosure (such
as audited financial statements), particular risks that the issuer
presents (such as major lawsuits, reliance on a small number of
customers, regulatory changes, etc.), together with major devel-
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opments affecting the corporation in real-time (such as mergers,
major financings, changes in senior executives, etc.).
The beauty of the mandatory disclosure approach, which
goes a long way toward explaining its popularity, is that it
appears minimally intrusive and preserves the freedom of individual choice that is thought to be the hallmark of a democratic,
capitalist society. The federal government does not dictate what
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investors can or cannot invest in; it simply requires companies
to reveal material information to investors and lets investors
decide for themselves.
So far, so good. But do the securities laws actually work? Notwithstanding its minimalist intentions, mandatory disclosure
imposes heavy costs on companies and other market participants
such as underwriters and investors. The direct costs of compliance
and enforcement are substantial. Firms
issuing public securities must engage auditors and lawyers to assist with the
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maximize firm value to worrying about
what firms can and cannot say. The indirect
costs of mandatory disclosure are impressive as well. For example, the prohibitive
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costs of compliance may well preclude many small issuers from
issuing securities to the public, which inefficiently skews investment toward the largest issuers. Other indirect costs of mandatory
disclosure include the additional delay it imposes on capital raising, the costs of defending against lawsuits alleging misstatements
in disclosures, and the forced disclosure of sensitive or proprietary
company information to competitors.
Ultimately our view of the merits of securities regulation
should depend on the answer to a simple empirical question:
do the benefits of mandatory disclosure outweigh its costs?
While stating the question is easy enough, answering it is anything but. Testing the effectiveness of mandatory disclosure is
astonishingly difficult, mainly for two reasons. First, it is virtually impossible to measure (or even identify) the true costs and
benefits of mandatory disclosure-more on that below. Second,
the real-world statistical models used to test the securities laws'
effects are messy, plagued by both conceptual and technical difficulties. To illustrate: we can easily show that stocks became less
volatile following the Great Depression, but was that because of
the salutary effects of mandatory disclosure or simply because
the Great Depression wiped out so many risky issuers? A separate failing of existing attempts to gauge securities regulation's
effectiveness is that they have focused almost entirely on the
stock market rather than on the corporate debt markets. This is
an unfortunate and surprising omission because corporate debt
issuances are so much larger than corporate equity issuances,
and the economy suffers so much more when things go south
in the corporate debt markets.

NATURAL EXPERIMENT
In a forthcoming article in theJournalofCorporationLaw, I argue
that recent developments in the corporate debt markets create
a natural experiment testing whether mandatory disclosure is
effective-one that avoids the major pitfalls of prior empirical
tests. The natural experiment is provided by the dramatic convergence of certain risky corporate bonds ("high-yield" or "junk"
bonds) and corporate loans ("leveraged loans") into functionally
the same asset class. This surprising development is invaluable
for testing the securities laws' effectiveness because corporate
bonds are treated as securities under the U.S. securities laws
(and thus subject to the full weight of mandatory disclosure),
while corporate loans are not. Notwithstanding that high-yield
bonds and leveraged loans are regulated so differently, they have
recently become virtually identical as a functional matter. As
argued below, this convergence strongly suggests that the securities laws are not doing the work they were intended to do.
Changing paradigms of loans and bonds/ Why, historically, have

loans and bonds been treated differently under the securities
laws? This difference began when the laws were first enacted. It is
the product of the widely accepted view that securities regulation

should remain hands-off with respect to sophisticated parties
in bilateral commercial transactions, while carefully protecting
unsophisticated parties making passive investments.
Historically, the functional reality of corporate loans and
bonds meshed well with this regulatory framework. Traditional
corporate loans were made by a single bank to a single company.
As the sole lender, the bank had significant incentives and ability
to monitor the borrowing company closely and to negotiate loan
provisions that minimized credit risk. As such, loans have always
been viewed as commercial transactions (rather than investments)
made by sophisticated parties (banks) that do not require the
additional protection of the securities laws.
In contrast, bonds have always been viewed as passive investments. Bonds were traditionally sold widely to the general public,
including unsophisticated retail investors with little experience
in assessing credit risk and little ability to bear losses. Not
only are bonds sold to large numbers of passive investors, but
post-issuance they can be freely traded, making the connection
between the borrowing company and the ultimate investor
even more attenuated. Such investments, it was thought, clearly
demanded the protection of the securities laws. The regulatory
framework has been set by this dichotomy between loans and
bonds ever since.
But sweeping changes in the corporate debt markets, primarily
over the last 15 years, have turned the regulatory logic on its head.
More and more, corporate loans resemble bonds. Large corporate
loans are no longer funded and held to maturity by a single bank.
Instead, they are underwritten like bonds; they are funded by
many creditors (a process referred to as syndication), consisting
primarily ofnon-bank institutional investors. Post-funding, they
are rapidly traded in a liquid market and are often securitized to
reach still more creditors. The syndication and trading of loans
fundamentally changed the nature of corporate loans into their
traditional opposite-public bonds.
Two major developments drove this dramatic transformation. On the supply side, the increased competition and overlap
between commercial banking and investment banking (following the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act) and the Basel II rules on
bank capital requirements both prompted banks to get out of the
business of originating illiquid loans. Instead, they were incentivized to underwrite loans and sell them off to other creditors,
thereby allowing them to earn lucrative underwriting fees while
significantly diversifying their loan portfolios. On the demand
side, the rise of leveraged buyouts since the 1980s has fueled an
ever-increasing need for massive, tradable corporate debt.
The convergence between loans and bonds is the most striking at the high-risk, high-return end of the spectrum. "Leveraged
loans" and "high-yield bonds" are, respectively, loans and bonds
issued by companies that are below investment grade (i.e., that
have "junk" status). Investors in those markets now view the two
as functionally identical: they are issued with virtually the same
economic terms, the same covenants, and the same number and
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types of creditors. If banks are no longer the principal creditors
for leveraged loans, and the creditors act as passive investors in the
loans rather than as active monitors of the borrowing company,
and if leveraged loans have loose terms and are traded like bonds,
why aren't they regulated like bonds? Why aren't leveraged loans
treated as securities and subject to mandatory disclosure? Why
do they continue to escape the lengthy SEC registration process
when they are issued, and the onerous subsequent disclosures?
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are individuals who purchase and hold their investments directly,
rather than through an intermediary such as a mutual fund or
retirement plan manager.)
So we are left with only the second goal of mandatory disclosure: correcting inefficiencies in the production of company information. What is this all about? Even absent a legal mandate, companies seeking investors have substantial incentives to disclose
information to the public in order to attract and retain investment. In addition, investors have incentives
to seek out and even produce their own

If the ' ublic good"story about investment in,formation is
correct,then mandatory disclosure is betterfir both
investors andcompanies, andbrings us closer to teopi
mal equilibriumof supply and demandfor investment

information about companies. But many
scholars argue that, in the absence of regu-

lation, the market will not produce enough

information to attract the optimal level of
investment. Information is a public good,
the argument goes, and so the free market
under-produces accurate, material invest-

ment information. For example, because of

None of this makes sense if one believes that "like cases should
be treated alike" under the law. How we got here is a fascinating
story of innovation in the financial markets and regulatory pathdependence and inertia.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE LOAN-BOND CONVERGENCE

What does the existence of two identical markets that are regulated entirely differently tell us? How can it help us evaluate
the effectiveness of mandatory disclosure where past empirical
assessments have failed? For starters, focusing the inquiry on
the debt markets has a major advantage over prior studies of
the equity markets: it allows us to simplify the question enough
to finally answer it. In order to determine whether mandatory disclosure works, we need a clear picture of the benefits
it aims to provide. Then we can decide whether those benefits
exceed the costs. The two most commonly proposed benefits
of mandatory disclosure are protecting unsophisticated investors and correcting inefficiencies in the market for company
information. The second goal requires elaboration-but more
on that later.
The problem for prior studies of the securities laws is that these
two goals are in tension with each other, sometimes demanding
opposing courses of action. This tension makes it almost impossible to determine whether mandatory disclosure is achieving
its stated goals, even before we get to the question of whether
the benefits outweigh their costs. The benefit of zeroing in on
the debt markets is that this allows us to completely ignore the
first goal, protecting unsophisticated investors. This is because,
unlike the publicly traded stock markets, for example, today's
debt markets have essentially no direct retail investors, which are
the prototypical unsophisticated investor. (Direct retail investors

collective action and free-riding problems,
investors as a whole will not spend enough
to obtain the amount of accurate information that they actually
want. Similarly, the companies seeking investors do not have the
right incentives to coordinate to produce information that is
easily comparable to other companies' information, or to reveal
information that makes management look bad or that may be
viewed as proprietary. If that is the case, mandatory disclosure
can easily correct this inefficiency by simply requiring companies
to disclose material investment information to everyone, at the
same time, and in the same format. The argument is plausible
so far as it goes-it is simply an empirical question as to whether
such inefficiencies exist and whether mandatory disclosure is
actually mitigating them.
So mandatory disclosure need only satisfy one goal in the debt
markets: getting companies to produce the "right" amount of
information. How can we tell whether it is achieving that goal?
If mandatory disclosure is indeed correcting some inefficiency
in a given market, then mandatory disclosure should lead to an
increasein investment in that market. If the "public good" story
about investment information is correct, then mandatory disclosure is better for both investors and companies, and brings us closer
to the optimal equilibrium of supply and demand for investment
that would exist under perfect market conditions. In other words,
mandatory disclosure means more investment.
Looking at it in a slightly different way, if markets for two
identical financial instruments existed side-by-side, with the only
difference being that just one was subject to mandatory disclosure,
then all investors would prefer the regulated market. Companies
looking to attract investment would thus only issue in the regulated market-mandatory disclosure makes everyone better offl
Per our natural experiment described above, we have two
real-world markets for identical products, only one of which is
subject to mandatory disclosure. Leveraged loans and high-yield
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bonds are functionally identical, yet-contrary to the orthodoxy
of mandatory disclosure-more and more companies are choosing to issue leveraged loans over high-yield bonds. The market
not subject to mandatory disclosure is not only thriving, it is
surging past its regulated counterpart. The implication is plain:
in the corporate debt markets, mandatory disclosure is simply
not achieving its only plausible goal.
How can this be? The answer to that question determines how
we should think about securities regulation.

EXPLAINING THE STATUS QUO

The first possibility is that the premise behind mandatory disclosure-that regulation provides investors with better information than the market can-is simply false. Although dispersed,

if given the choice? Why is anyone still issuing high-yield bonds
and going through the time and expense of registering them
with the SEC when they could simply issue leveraged loans
instead? The likely explanation is that-for reasons that may
themselves no longer be valid-many institutional investors
are required to hold all or some minimum portion of their
investments as registered securities. Mutual funds, for example,
are often required to invest in registered securities: as between
leveraged loans and high-yield bonds, they are compelled to pick
high-yield bonds, and thus some companies will continue to
issue high-yield bonds in order to access that liquidity. Similarly,
whether for regulatory or political reasons, pension funds may
choose to invest at least some portion of their assets in registered
securities. If the general public believes that registered securities
are somehow less risky (even if they are mistaken), then pension
funds would be wise to invest in registered
securities in order to avoid the public ire

Maintainingthe regulatory status quo allows regulators
and marketparticpantsto go their merry warys while
turninga blind eye to thefact that the regulatory scheme
no longerpasses the laugh test.

when a downturn occurs.
So where do we go from here? Treating
leveraged loans and high-yield bonds differently under the securities laws no longer
makes any sense at all from a functional
standpoint. Yet, perhaps surprisingly, I
come down on the side of maintaining the

regulatory status quo for the time being,
passive investors are clearly subject to free-riding and collective
action problems; in today's markets they appear to obtain the
investment information that they need regardless. Particularly
in the debt markets, virtually all information that is relevant to
investors can be (and is) simply obtained through contract: the
loan agreement or bond indenture requires the borrowing company to produce annual audited financials, to report on material
developments and events, and so forth. Contract is doing the
work that regulations purport to do. In addition, more and more
private services are popping up that compile and present relevant
market information, filling niches not yet satisfied by the rating
agencies (which have recently begun rating loans in addition to
their longstanding practice of rating bonds).
The other possibility is that information inefficiencies are
indeed real in investment markets, but that the costs of mandatory disclosure are too high in comparison. Perhaps the SEC
is asking companies to disclose all the wrong things or asking
them to disclose far too much, or perhaps the compliance costs
are crowding out too many worthy companies. Any of these
could explain the dramatic rise and success of the leveraged
loan market, notwithstanding its unregulated status under the
securities laws.
But now we have another puzzle posed by our natural experiment: if mandatory disclosure is not effective or its costs are
excessive, why would any company issue in the regulated market

for three reasons. First, letting our natural experiment continue for a significant
period of time should provide invaluable information about what
works and what does not work with the mandatory disclosure
rules. Comparing the disclosure practices in the leveraged loan
and high-yield bond markets over time, and tracking which of the
two markets is attracting the most investment, will provide a rare
opportunity to observe regulatory success or failure in practice.
Second, since some investors are still restricted to purchasing
registered securities (as noted above), there is some justification
for continuing to treat high-yield bonds as securities in order
to avoid shutting those investors out of the high-yield space
entirely. Finally, maintaining the current state of play is unlikely
to do much harm given that, if issuers want to avoid the burdens
of mandatory disclosure, they can simply issue leveraged loans
instead. And if mandatory disclosure is not doing any real work,
there is no cause for imposing it on leveraged loans. Regulators
and market participants can go their merry ways while turning a
blind eye to the fact that the regulatory scheme no longer passes
the laugh test.
None of this is to say that the debt markets and debt-market
participants should be left entirely unregulated. Market bubbles
fueled by excessive leverage are damaging to the wider economy,
and the right regulatory approach could conceivably limit their
frequency and severity without excessively hampering corporate
financing. Unfortunately, our current securities laws simply are
not fulfilling that role.

